

Phenomenology of Information

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The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the connection between info-autopoiesis, based on Bateson's *difference which makes a difference*, and Peircean phenomenology or phaneroscopy.

Info-autopoiesis is the self-referenced process of information self-production that engages all living beings in their efforts to satisfy their physiological and social needs (Jaime F. Cárdenas-García 2020; Jaime F. Cárdenas-García and Ireland 2019; Jaime F. Cárdenas-García and Ireland 2020; Burgin and Cárdenas-García 2020). Bateson's *difference which makes a difference* incorporates the simultaneity of a quantitative/objective perspective with a qualitative/subjective perspective. These perspectives develop from the interaction of Impersonal/Objective/ Absolute Information and Personal/Subjective/Relative Information, which result in Shannon/ Distilled Information. In interacting with its environment, the human-organism develops from a state in which its knowledge of the human-organism-in-its-environment is almost non-existent to a state in which the human-organism not only recognizes the existence of the environment but also sees itself as part of the human-organism-in-its-environment system. This allows a human-organism not only to self-referentially engage with the environment and navigate through it, but to even transform it in its own image and likeness. This is a succinct description of the phenomenology relevant to info-autopoiesis in the development of the human-organism.

Peircean phenomenology is grounded in the categories of — Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness — which corresponds to an exhaustive system of hierarchically organized classes of relations (Charles Sanders Peirce 1883; Charles S. Peirce 1931–36, 1958). In brief, the categories can be defined as: (1) “Firstness: what is such as it is, without reference to anything else”. This implies that “Firstness” has a subjective basis, since it exists without any reference to anything else. This is the living being just existing in a world of its own and does not need referring to anything else to be in the moment; (2) “Secondness: what is such as it is, in relation with something else, but without relation with any third entity”. This implies that “Secondness” has an objective basis, since it exists with reference to something else. This is the living being existing in a world in which other things exist, and is able to engage in interactions with those things that do not lead anywhere; and, (3) “Thirdness: what is such as it is, insofar as it is capable of bringing a second entity into relation with a first one in the same way that it brings itself into

relation with the first and the second entities”. This implies that “Thirdness” has both a subjective and objective basis, being able to interact with other things so as to compare and contrast them.

A congruent comparison between these two approaches requires the examination of a triadic relationship between elements in each approach, as well as establishing relevant connections between info-autopoiesis and phaneroscopy.

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